EMBASSY ATTACK ECHOES FAMILIAR PATTERN Peace Overtures and Bombings Seem Odd Bedfellows, But They Collided Repeatedly in Vietnam. By Peter Dale Scott Pacific News Service The recent bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade looks like a replay. During the Vietnam War era, U.S. forces hit political targets, specifically embassies, just when international peace initiatives looked promising. The attack on the Chinese Embassy came one day after Russia and leading NATO nations agreed to a set of general principles for ending the conflict over Kosovo. NATO has called the incident unintentional, but the Chinese claim that three precision missiles hit the embassy. Witness reports appear to corroborate the Chinese version. The threat to the peace process is obvious. The draft plan calls for approval by the U.N. Security Council, where China, a bitter opponent of the bombing, exercises a veto. This recalls December 1966, when the Romanian premier visited Hanoi in support of a secret Polish peace initiative dubbed "Marigold." In mid-December U.S. bombing of downtown Hanoi reached unprecedented levels, after months when the city's center had been off-limits to American planes. During the raids one U.S. rocket damaged three adjacent embassies - the Romanian, the Polish and the Chinese, which effectively terminated Marigold. The United States called the embassy bombings unintentional. But such correlations occurred repeatedly. In April 1966, just as a Polish diplomat was arriving in Hanoi to initiate Marigold, bombs dropped near a Polish vessel in a Vietnamese harbor. In June 1967, just after the White House-Kremlin hot line was first used in a search for a diplomatic solution, the Soviet freighter Turkestan was bombed by two U.S. fighter planes. Johnson's policy Three times, in almost identical circumstances, other Polish and Soviet vessels were later attacked. When two French emissaries bearing a U.S. peace message arrived in Hanoi in 1967, another surge in bombing rocked the city. The habit of timing bombs to peace initiatives apparently began as a deliberate policy of Lyndon Johnson, who habitually balanced concessions to hawks and doves. Thus Johnson authorized the December 1966 raids at the LBJ ranch in November, one day after he learned of Marigold from his roving ambassador, Averell Harriman. In this way Johnson ensured that if the North Vietnamese did negotiate, it would be in a context of humiliating air strength. But by June 1967 a different pattern emerged, one involving military attacks that the president had forbidden. When activating the Washington-Moscow hot line in late May, Johnson ordered U.S. pilots to stay away from Hanoi and Haiphong, where there were Soviet ships. The two pilots who had attacked the Turkestan knew they were violating presidential orders. They and their commander tried to conceal the incident, the latter by destroying the planes' flight film. McNamara's omission In his memoir, former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara recalled the "scathing denial" he erroneously issued after this incident, blaming "an outright lie by a military officer." He added that the colonel responsible for the bombing was later court-martialed and fined. McNamara did not mention that the colonel's conviction and $600 fine were soon set aside. The two pilots were acquitted and remained on active duty, even though their unauthorized action had killed a Soviet seaman. This suggests that the bombing had high-level military support. A similar Air Force action in 1971 temporarily ended a series of secret meetings that Henry Kissinger had been holding with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho. To help the meetings President Richard Nixon had limited air strikes against North Vietnam to "protective reaction" after enemy attacks. But the Air Force general in charge of the air war, John Lavelle, continued to target North Vietnam, instructing the pilots to suppress the fact that there had been no enemy provocation. Thus Kissinger was caught off guard when Le Duc Tho broke off the talks in November, insisting (over Kissinger's misinformed denials) that the bombing went beyond "protective reaction." In short, it is clear that in the past, U.S. military commanders have bombed without authorization at times of significant peace initiatives of which they apparently did not approve. It is too early to analyze with confidence how the attack on the Chinese embassy occurred, but history demonstrates that such incidents frustrate diplomacy and prolong war. -- Peter Dale Scott is a former Canadian diplomat whose 1972 book, "Conspiracy," analyzed such bombing incidents.